However, there is also a negative aspect of IPRs in plant breeding, due to the control of a few on the plant varieties so that the system restricts access to the information and the germplasm. If this system is replaced by a system which provides for remuneration without ownership (IPRs), the negative aspect of IPRs will be minimized.

Such a system is closer to the original idea of PBRs. During 1941-1966 in the Dutch system: prevalent in the Netherlands, the farmers were levied a small tax on each crop on the basis of area planted under that crop and the tax was collected into a pooled fund from which the breeders were paid remuneration proportionate to the area occupied by each of their new varieties. In this system, the farmers could grow, swap, multiply or sell the seed to any body.

This system provides a solution to the incompatibility between lPR and farmers' rights and allows (i) remuneration and incentive to plant breeders; (ii) freedom to farmers for saving, selling, swapping and multiplying the PGRs and using them for breeding purposes without violating IPRs; (iii) incentives to farmers to preserve, create and enhance biological diversity.

The above system, however, does not compensate for past contributions of farmers for conserving and improving PGRs. The system also has the following problems: (i) it does not account for rights for F₁ hybrids; (ii) how to estimate the area sown by a particular variety?; (iii) how to assess which variety it is?; (iv) how to share the pooled fund among breeders? Some of these problems are actually inherent even in the IPR system.